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De Improvisatione Gerald L. Bruns 
Here's a man wants me to revise, to put in order. My 
God what I am doing means just the opposite from that. 
There is no revision, there can be no revision? 
William Carlos Williams 
The Great American Novel 
FROM A MILDLY ETYMOLOGICAL point of view an improvisation 
is a species of unforeseen discourse. One cannot predict anything about it. It 
is discourse that makes no provision for a future, not in the reader's mind 
nor, certainly, in the writer's; its teleology is entirely in the present. It is 
discourse whose beginning is what matters, because to improvise is to begin 
without a second thought, and under the rules there is no turning back. It is 
discourse that is governed by no provisos, and so differs from nearly every 
other discourse one can imagine: it is ungeneric almost by definition; it is a 
close semblance of free speech. 
At the outset it will appear that its defining categories are composition 
and performance. Improvisation is the performance of a composition in the 
moment of its composition. One preserves such a moment by refusing to 
revise its results. To call a thing an improvisation is to say: This is as it was 
when 
originated. Or, again, an improvisation is an extemporaneous utter 
ance, except that (speaking precisely) to speak ex tempore is to compose in 
the heat of performance, and what is composed may seem less an improvi 
sation than, say, an epic or a song in ottava rima, wherein much is prepared 
for, or less than one imagines is left to chance. An improvisation that is not 
a public or salon event may be performed under no pressure to compose, 
and vice versa; it is not necessarily a thinking out loud, and perhaps it never 
is. It is, to be sure, speech that is allowed to stand as written; it is unrevised 
utterance. But mainly it is discourse that proceeds independently of reflec 
tion; it does not stop to check on itself. It is deliberate but undeliberated. 
Improvisation is thus accessible to simple definition: it is unplanned dis 
course. One cannot say beforehand how it will end, what it will say or re 
semble, or whether it will bear repeating. To improvise is simply to write 
without an end in view; it is perhaps to write with nothing in view, not 
even an audience. Improvisations are therefore naturally intransitive: they 
are an innocent or Unf?llen kind of speech, unused and unusing because un 
designed and undesigning: they have designs upon no one, because they are 
themselves unprepared and unprepared for, uncared for and wild in virtue 
of improvident authorship. 
Imagine, therefore, a guileful improvisation: it would have a secret pur 
pose and a secret history (a providence): as when Cicero advises us to write 
down our Senate speeches the night before, the better to speak extem 
poraneously without misdirection. Premeditation is guilt, but it is also poli 
tics and the better part of public wisdom. An improvisation that is repeated 
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is an improvisation fallen, used, sullied by experience: one repeats it, but 
only by design. In this event it becomes ?pens?e, part of an inventory or 
tradition, something found, a replenishment of memory, a sign of copious 
ness, a lesson. 
Improvisation is a specialized form of artless discourse, an evasion of 
Adam's Curse. It is unpoetic because wilfully unmade, more event than 
work, an effect whose system of causes has been made to work contingent 
ly, as if to no effect (as if? no doubt here is the contamination of art: an 
improvisation is contingent, but not accidental; it is not automatic writing). 
An improvisation is conceived in forgetfulness or in studied ignorance; it is 
what happens without respect to previous statements. A poetics of im 
provisation would never seem applicable in the moment one takes pen in 
hand. An improvisation is arguably the most original of utterances because 
it is unprompted and unprecedented, impromptu and unlearned, unimitat 
ing and inimitable. It is never the cry of its occasion, and differs therefore 
from the sally or the barb, wit as riposte, because it is unprovoked as well as 
unpremeditated. It is therefore doubly innocent. 
Innocent, but not witless, and therein lies a true complication. Unpro 
voked wit is one definition of genius, imagination, etc.: spontaneities of ta 
lent, mythologies of unconscious or at all events unschooled generation. To 
such mythologies the improvisator naturally appeals for the sanction of his 
utterances: he will always claim a native or divine authority. It is clear, 
however, that what we call the unconscious is, quite as much as tradition or 
learning, a natural enemy of improvisational desire. The unconscious is full 
of artful subterfuge; it shapes our unplanned utterances with unforeseen 
forethoughts?or foreforms, if one permits such things, for the mind is a 
repository of hidden and ready formations, a dark library of grammars 
whose nature it is to make possible the inspired and the rash: dreams, talk, 
solemn unbreakable vows. The unconscious is the great beforehand where 
everything is in rehearsal. It is made up of quotations waiting for words. It 
is our 
metaphor of awful power, the muse of sorts whose dictations pro 
duce our 
"unpremeditated Verse." 
Here it will be good to distinguish between rhetorical and Romantic im 
provisation. Rhetorical improvisation is related to embellishment and or 
namentation; it is an art of doing something to what has already been done. 
In music and in poetry it is a way of exceeding what is written by working 
between the lines or in the margin, or by using the text as a point of depar 
ture or as a program of intervals. Improvisation in this case is not an art of 
free origination; it begins instead with what is received, which it then pro 
ceeds to color, amplify, or fulfill, never to abolish or forget. Rhetorical im 
provisation presupposes invention as an art of finding or figuring, whereas, 
for the Romantic, invention is unschooled and autonomous creation, anti 
plagiary, a studied freedom from readable antecedents. Romantic improvi 
sation begins with a blank sheet of paper; rhetorical improvisation begins 
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with a sheet of paper on which a poem or score is written but which con 
tains to the knowing or the artful eye large and indeterminate areas of some 
thing left unsaid, unsung, or tacitly unfinished. It would in practice be hard 
to distinguish Romantic improvisation from a spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings, or indeed origination of any kind. Romantically, to 
poetize is as much as to improvise; the rest is the business of reason, the 
agency of recognition and revision, reminder of the better or the proven 
way. 
Improvisation is gameless play: gameless, because what improvisation 
requires is a type of disruption. Imagine an improvised chess game, and you 
get something the Marx Brothers would play. Chess is heavy with rules, 
but what matters is the concentration of decision that attaches to each se 
quence of moves. Chess is more plot than character (no move has meaning 
by itself). It is a game from which improvisation has been systematically re 
moved, nor can improvisation return even as a last or desperate chance (it 
would be present only as a symptom of the game's distintegration). Thus 
openings and secondary deployments and strategies in unforeseen cir 
cumstances are capable not only of being repeated but of acquiring fame and 
bearing names, as though the true antagonists in chess were forms of action 
rather than agency. In chess improvisation is indistinguishable from the 
blunder or mere ignorance; it is a departure from that which has a deter min 
able and conceivably fortunate end. What is not foreseeable or provident in 
chess is always a form of undoing, and what is undone is someone's partici 
pation in the game. Thus an improvisation would become parody or anar 
chy or buffoonery: it would require the disruption not only of moves but of 
rules and usages and even of the principles of mental order on which such a 
thing as chess (art, the state, culture) is based: and not mental order only, 
but the order of transactions by which players are brought into systematic 
and sometimes affectionate kinship. Moves in chess speak: they communi 
cate intentions and 
compel answers. Improvisations are by contrast inscrut 
able and unanswerable and presuppose the operations of a solitary singer. 
To say that writing is intransitive is to say that it is meant chiefly to be 
made, not read. A certain unreadability is built into every intransitive utter 
ance, and in improvisations this unreadability is writ large by the natural 
invisibility of improvisational results. Certainly one function of improvisa 
tion is to outwit the reader; it is to disrupt readerly expectations and the 
consequent ability to recognize what is taking place. The unpredictability of 
improvisational discourse means exactly that the improvisator is hard or 
impossible to follow: we cannot get a line on him, because his lines do not 
proceed or follow one another in linear or generic fashion: we cannot see 
where he is going, cannot anticipate his turns, and are literally left standing 
there, unreading, as he disappears into the page. At such moments we do 
not know where we stand, yet we have not exactly lost our way because 
there is no way to lose: the improvisation is meant to send us off in false 
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directions, but only in the appeal that no directions are true because none 
exist. The improvisation is ungeneric precisely to the extent that it con 
founds those signals that we normally use to complete the text we have not 
finished reading; it dismantles the virtual or heuristic whole that we need to 
construct in order to guide ourselves and make orderly our progress 
through the parts of what we read. And even when we have finished we 
cannot say exactly what we have read: it impresses us mainly by being fami 
lar, perhaps, but not quite the thing we had in mind. 
From a formalist point of view it would follow that an improvisation is a 
kind of negative discourse: intransitive, yet not formal or aesthetic, so in 
transitive as to be in general disregard of beauty. A formalist would say that 
formal relations of the kind one looks for in poetic or artful speech do not 
always occupy the foreground of the improvisational utterance, neither are 
they absorbed into something uttered. What is unaccountable is the seeming 
care with which form is averted without being abolished. Relations appear 
to exist, but only to disappear the moment we try to apprehend them ac 
cording to a model of formal intelligibility. No other form of discourse ap 
pears to possess this elusiveness of form: elusiveness, for what the improvi 
sation achieves is not formlessness but transience and namelessness of form, 
its ghostly and insubstantial presence or behavior. Form is contingent. The 
formalist would say that the improvisation achieves an aversion rather than 
a subversion of form, which is why the improvisation that declines into 
babble is usually rejected as (simply) a failed utterance. And this is also why 
improvisations are always an incitement to interpretation, with mixed and 
unimpressive results, the more so as interpretation naturally deforms the 
improvisation into the sort of discourse it most nearly resembles. 
Accordingly, the first improvisation of Kora in Hell traps us into an inad 
vertent 
reading: "fools have big wombs. 
. . 
." The sentence seems indis 
tinguishable from a quotation: we have heard (something like) it before. It is 
a 
saying, an adage or proverb, and it contains a moral appropriate to the 
form: fools indeed have big wombs, for they are fertile and prolific and their 
progeny have spread to every human culture, each of which maintains a 
vast literature on the subject. But Williams's first improvisation is not con 
summated in this saying. In its entirety it reads as follows: 
Fools have big wombs. For the rest??here is pennyroyal if one knows 
to use it. But time is only another liar, so go along the wall a little 
further: if blackberries prove bitter there'll be mushrooms, fairy-ring 
mushrooms, in the grass, sweetest of all fungi. (33)* 
*I have used the first edition (Boston: The Four Seas Company, 1920), which seems to con 
tain fewer omissions than subsequent editions. The first edition is a beautiful book; it would be 
good to have a facsimile of it. 
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One may as well know that pennyroyal is a medicinal herb ("small leaves 
and a prostrate habit"?OED), thought once to be effective against com 
mon hysteria, and somewhat bitter to the taste, which is perhaps why the 
voice of the improvisation, after warning us against the false promises of 
time, guides us further along the wall (where the pennyroyal doubtless 
grows), past the also-bitter blackberries, to the fairy-ring mushrooms 
(Marasmius orcades), "sweetest of all the fungi." Surely one could go further 
still, thus perhaps to assemble different categories of folk wisdom: (1) ad 
ages concerning fools (and those who count on time for something better); 
(2) treatment of nervous disorders; (3) the superiority of the fairy-ring 
mushroom. Interpretation is as resourceful as improvisation?but to what 
end? The end is precisely what has been removed from consideration. What 
we have above sounds like an excerpt from a longer speech: sounds like, 
which is roughly the sort of illusion improvisations are gifted to sustain, 
because they seem to fall between recognizable categories of speech. Con 
nections are missing that presumably a context could supply, which is 
where interpretation comes in (needlessly, no doubt desperately) to imagine 
now this context, now that, in order to build among the parts of the impro 
visation a formal continuity that is plainly absent?a continuity unavoidably 
unwritten and which the text seems actively to resist. 
A minor lesson to be drawn from this is that improvisations tend to occur 
at the level of the discourse, not at the level of the sentence. Improvisations 
at the level of the sentence are indistinguishable from what any competent 
speaker of a language may produce for any reason whatsoever and with no 
effort at all. "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is a sort of improvisa 
tion at the level of the sentence, chiefly because it has sustained a disruption 
of linguistic rule without dispersing into babble: it still sounds like a sen 
tence, and can even be made to read like one when transposed to a provident 
context. A similar analysis may be brought to bear upon Williams's justly 
admired "When beldams dig clams their fat hams. ..." ?which is, how 
ever, only part of an utterance that illustrates nicely the theory of gameless 
play: 
When beldams dig clams their fat hams (it's always beldams) balanced 
near Tellus's hide, this rhinoceros pelt, these lumped stones, buffoon 
ery of midges on a bull's thigh?invoke,?what you will: birth's glut, 
awe at God's craft, youth's poverty, evolution of a child's caper, 
man's poor inconsequence. Eclipse of all things; sun's self turned hen's 
rump. (55) 
(Tellus's hide is the earth's skin and is consonant with the improvisation's 
anatomical bias.) The body of this improvisation is motored by three sub 
stantives: "this rhinoceros pelt, these lumped stones, buffoonery of 
midges," which together "invoke,?what you will," that is, almost any 
thing at all, or whatever can be fitted into the sound of an epithet: "birth's 
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glut, awe at God's craft," etc. No need to stop at "man's poor inconse 
quence": as a mode of utterenace the list is one of the more powerful 
mechanisms by which improvisational discourse can amplify itself, because 
the list (unlike the game) is plotless, episodic, one damn thing after another: 
it contains no internal demands for a conclusion. A list is something that 
one can introduce into a sentence as a way of making it go on forever, 
which theoretically it can do because a list does not end, it stops, often 
owing to weariness, or because something has run dry. A list is a way of 
exceeding the limits of the sentence without actually abolishing them. 
When old women dig clams they get down on their haunches, which 
hover therefore near the sand. Students of Williams will recognize in this 
information a characteristically treasured fact, an observation released from 
its reasons: simply one of those things Williams tends to notice. A more 
complicated attention to fact is contained in this improvisation: 
There's the bathtub. Look at it, caustically rejecting its smug propos 
al. Ponder removedly the herculean task of a bath. There's much 
cameraderie in filth but it's no' that. And change is lightsome but it's 
not that either. Fresh Unen with a dab here, there of the wet paw 
serves me better. Take a stripling stroking chin-fuzz, match his heart 
against that of grandpa watching his silver wane. When these two are 
compatible I'll plunge in. But where's the edge lifted between sunlight 
and moonlight. Where does lamplight cease to nick it? Here's hot wa 
ter. (74) 
There's the bathtub: when you look at it you will see not simply an object 
but a whole society of meanings?a world of reasons. Thus you will recog 
nize a bathtub by its superior attitude: it belongs to (among) the better sort 
of people. As for cameraderie, the better sort of people do not engage in it. 
Cameraderie exists among soldiers, ballplayers, young boys, grandfathers 
and grandsons: cameraderie is not a bathtub word, and for much the same 
reason it is not a female word. One naturally prefers filth to cleanliness as 
one prefers company to solitude. Most often one bathes alone and acquires 
thereby self-satisfaction not possible to share: one feels better, perhaps one 
is better for having bathed (although Dr. Williams does not think so). 
Naturally a bathtub would propose a bath: propose is a bathtub word. 
Comrades, for example, do not propose; colleagues propose, as do superi 
ors, associates, junior partners seeking ready advancement. One does not 
go unbathed into the world of proposals, no more than one enters the com 
pany of women so, nor certainly does one go filthy into a single woman's 
company, where a proposal is apt to occur, sooner or later: whence the 
comradely world is lost. What is gained is access to the world kept by the 
better sort, a world of solitude, where one is required to tolerate endlessly 
the smugness of junior partners who probably bathe twice a day. So you see 
one has to decide carefully whether to bathe, for every bath taken or re 
jected is a statement of allegience and profession of value, unless one is dead 
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tired, in which case bathing becomes a herculean labor: the time and effort 
required simply to climb into a tub of water must be weighed against how 
good it would surely feel. Reasons. Go ahead. Here's hot water. 
An improvisation is an unwashed 
utterance. 
Is there a law peculiar to an improvisation by William Carlos Williams? 
An 18th-century improvissatore would seek to improvise an utterance that 
would show none of the effects of its production; it would be his desire to 
produce the illusion of orderly composition spontaneously achieved (a song 
in ottava rima, with not a syllable out of place). Notice that this is a 
variation on the ancient dream of an artfulness that can produce artless or 
natural perfection, whence it becomes the obligation of the artist to conceal 
his art, or at any rate to hide the effort that his artifice naturally requires. 
The improvissatore does not disregard the perfection of art: his performance 
is governed by the same ideal of the homogeneous work that governs all art: 
it is his desire to seem to accomplish at first try what other singers require 
planning and revision to produce. Pope, who originally lisped in numbers, 
desired no less, but understood more: namely, that planning and revision 
are the activities that make effortless art possible. Oddly, Romantic impro 
visation (Romantic creativity) is not inconsistent with this discussion: it 
rests upon a belief in the trustworthiness of imagination, which is said to be 
able to produce on its own (without the intervention of conscious will, or 
simply by following the native laws of its development) a whole work, a 
homogeneous text figurable as an organism, something whose parts are 
integrated into a superior unity and which can compete against (perhaps is 
even greater than) the great works of art produced by the ancient masters. 
But Williams's improvisations are dependably heterogeneous. The impro 
visation of the bathtub, for example, contains these lines: "But where's the 
edge lifted between sunlight and moonlight. Where does lamplight cease to 
nick it?" The question we are trained to ask is: How do these lines fit in? In 
order to answer this question we would have to imagine reasons why the 
voice of the improvisation would compose them?not an impossible job, 
but one that is difficult to bring off without seeming absurd, because 
Williams's purpose (the whole point of writing improvisations) is to avoid 
the reasons of art. It is to resist composition of a discourse whose parts are 
accessible to uniform accounting. Indeed, in an improvisation by Williams 
the privileged line is no longer the line that seems to condense and confirm 
the whole; equally welcome now is the incongruous line, such that a 
uniform reading of an improvisation may have to leave one or more lines 
out of account. Hence the interpretive invisibility of "But where's the 
edge," etc. Interpretation performs the duty that revision declines: namely, 
the silent removal of incongruities. For Williams, the imagination will not 
naturally produce an utterance that contains in itself the reasons why it is so 
and not otherwise; it does not aspire to the condition or illusion of art. 
We are thus on the verge of affirming still one more time the doctrine of 
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anti- or counterpoetry, and no doubt we can plead sufficient reason for 
doing so; yet such a doctrine no more gives the law of Williams's improvi 
sations than does, say, a doctrine of imagination. The imagination does not 
aspire to?but neither does it flee from art. A poem can be made out of any 
thing, including a familiar amble of Tennysonian decorum: "there's many a 
good backroad among the clean raked fields" (77). An improvisation by 
Williams is likely to be heterogeneous, but it is not therefore anaesthetic. 
When assembing the parts of Kora in Hell Williams left out those improvisa 
tions which were merely failed utterances; he did not hesitate to include 
many unaccountable lapses into art. One of Williams's improvisations is a 
story of the Good Physician. It begins: "After thirty years staring at one 
true phrase he discovered that its opposite was true also" (68). The story? 
perhaps you would prefer to call it an anecdote?is an illustration of this 
opening statement as of a moral: the doctor is indeed an embodiment of the 
Good Physician (he answers calls in the middle of the night, etc.). But every 
act or event that confirms him in his nobility becomes transparent to him: 
he sees through every confirming moment to that which contradicts it? 
contradicts it without, however, falsifying it: "Summoned to his door by a 
tinkling bell he looked into a white face, the face of a man convulsed with 
dread, at the laughter back of its drawn alertness" (69). Or, again: "He 
plunges up the dark steps on his grotesque deed of mercy. In his warped 
brain an owl of irony fixes on the immediate object of his care as if it were 
the thing to be destroyed, guffaws at the impossibility of putting any kind 
of value on the object inside [an unborn child] or of even reversing or 
making less by any other means than induced sleep?which is no solution? 
the methodical gripe of the sufferer" (69). The "owl of irony" is a phrase 
worth having, although one suspects that a more deliberate and therefore 
less figurative Williams would not have written it. It is an allegorical phrase, 
and so well does it summarize the story that one could imagine it as the 
title?which is one way of saying that in this improvisation part and whole 
are combined in an entirely traditional relationship. 
And this suggests in turn that the law peculiar to an improvisation by 
Williams is not the law of formal violation pure and simple but the law of 
unpredictability (as in Cicero, for whom improvisum is the figure by which 
an expression takes an unexpected but forgivable turn). One imagines that if 
anomalies had crept prominently into the improvisation of the Good Physi 
cian, Williams would have allowed them to stand and would have relished 
their prominence; but the art of writing improvisations does not stipulate 
(how could it?) that nothing but anomalies shall be composed. Perhaps it is 
this that makes Kora in Hell different from the Continental affronteries with 
which it is still sometimes associated: there is in Williams no active principle 
of derangement, no unsparing abuse of sense. There is, for example, very 
little that can be called anomalous in the following: 
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Something to grow used to; a stone too big for ox haul, too near for 
blasting. Take the road round it or?scrape away, scrape away: a 
mountain's buried in the dirt! Go yourself down along the lit pastures. 
Down, down. The whole family take shovels, babies and all! Down, 
down! Here's Tenochtitlan! here's a strange Darien where worms are 
princes. (57) 
Country Life in America. Chapter One. The Rock. Once every farm in 
America had its rock story. (Great-grandpa Kirsch tried to raise it when he 
cleared this field. So did pa. Finally pa said: Holds the land together. Once 
when we brought home our first tractor I took the plow over it and got me 
such a whipping. No one can tell how deep it goes. China. South America. 
Stella says it's probably down as far as Uncle Ben.)The rock is quintessen 
tial, as Thoreau and Stevens knew: it is that which remains intractable; it is 
the instance of our circumventions and, accordingly, that to which our 
attention repeatedly returns as to the truth or origin of things. Every 
unmoved rock is piece and principle of the frontier, unsettled by illusions. 
Scholia: Tenochtitlan was the ancient capital of the Aztecs, since replaced 
by Mexico City. It is where Cortes was instead of the peak on which Keats 
placed him. The real and perhaps unfamiliar Darien is in Panama; or 
perhaps it is whatever lies across a frontier, or beneath it, where worms are 
princes because if you dig deep enough you come to a place where things 
are 
upside down. No anomalies here. 
Still, one's attention returns to the story of the Good Physician and its 
opening statement; there is something representative about it. The natural 
inclination of criticism is to read this principle of mutual contradiction as a 
testament not only of Williams the physician but also of Williams the 
writer?but in this special sense: contradiction is the privileged and indis 
pensable category of skepticism (skepticism is perhaps impossible except by 
recourse to contradiction as an authorizing principle). Yet this is not quite 
so for Williams, who regards contradiction less as a sign of unreason or 
mental failure than as a frequent state of affairs: the simplest consequence, 
for example, of real events, which, lacking providence, contrive to interfere 
with one another, as do on occasion the several parts of an improvisation. 
Improvisation is history. Whereas contradiction is traditionally the occasion 
of despair or satires against credulity, for Williams it is (1) good fun, and (2) 
a condition of plentitude or the completeness of things?as one notices 
especially when one of the improvisations of Kora in Hell fails of itself to 
produce a whole waywardness: 
This is a slight stiff dance to a waking baby whose arms have been 
lying curled back above his head upon the pillow, making a flower? 
the eyes closed. Dead to the world! Waking is a little hand brushing 
away dreams. Eyes open. Here's a new world. 
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There is nothing the sky-serpent will not eat. Sometimes it stoops to gnaw 
Fujiyama, sometimes to slip its long and softly clasping tongue about the body 
of a sleeping child who smiles thinking its mother is lifting it. (76) 
The improvisation here is an episode of uncontaminated domestic warmth 
such as one would expect the Good Physician to affirm; the "interpretation" 
which Williams placed after it is a countervailing macabre fantasy composed 
by (who else?) the "owl of irony." So far from being a sign of unreason or 
something not working, the contradiction is a construction, the work of an 
ordering and editorial hand: the "owl of irony" is self-consciously dialecti 
cal, but rhetorically rather than logically so. Rhetoric (like history) provides 
for the expression of opposite and inseparable truths, whereas logic requires 
that we choose between them or seek their assimilation into a superior and 
resolving order. For rhetoric (like history) is eventual in its proceedings and 
copious in its results: it declaims now one truth, now another, in the interest 
of leaving nothing unspoken, whereas logic aspires to the simultaneity and 
cleanliness of system, into which nothing incongruous may proceed with 
out transformation or, failing that, without doing damage to the before and 
after of every thought. It may be for this reason that philosophers regularly 
give us an implausible estimate of the world; it is certainly why there is no 
one more hateful to the philosopher than the rhetorician, who has his eye 
fixed not on systems but on the plenum of his inventory, because he knows 
that you must be ready to take everything into account in a world where 
nothing is predictable and anything can happen. Hence the sophistry of his 
tory: that which is true is simply that which occurs, as everything does, 
sooner or later. Mind or philosophy, the content or method of your think 
ing, have nothing to do with it. 
An improvisation by Williams is essentially a private utterance, but only 
in odd and complicated ways. By his time the improvisation had ceased to 
be a public form or type of public verbal performance (ex tempore lyricism 
to musical accompaniment). As written discourse an improvisation by 
Williams is by its very nature privately performed, but it is therefore pub 
lishable in a way that an 18th-century improvisation is not. As a mode of ex 
tempore utterance the improvisation by Metastasio is naturally fleeting: it is 
speech whose most compelling feature (how does he do it?) cannot be pre 
served by writing. The improvisation in this case belongs to the world of 
sound, voice, and spirit, which written records always betray. One does not 
write improvisations of this sort, one writes them down, as an improvissatore 
sometimes did, to the disappointment of many. An improvisation by 
Metastasio is first spoken (or sung), then written, which means that it is 
never an instance of original but only of secondary or documentary 
writing?and confirmation of the principle that to write down one's impro 
visations is to turn them into bad writing. Hence, by contrast, the originali 
ty of an improvisation by Williams, which is never anything but written: 
not written speech but writing pure and simple, which imitates the spoken 
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utterance chiefly by not getting revised. Improvised writing imitates the 
most unwanted feature of spoken discourse (waywardness), which writing 
was invented to get rid of. It is because it is unrevised that an improvisation 
by Williams is essentially private: it is writing in a form which the public 
almost never sees, the original form, which only the writer sees and which 
it is ordinarily his profession to remove from view. In this respect a chief 
property of improvisational discourse will be its difference from published 
(and therefore professional) forms of writing. The dynamics of publication 
provide especially for revision, and not revision only but repeated applica 
tion of correctional arts designed to produce a fair and finished copy: an edi 
tion. But an improvisation by Williams is writing deliberately left in draft, 
as though not meant for publication: relentlessly original, private and un 
readied writing incompletely composed in defiance of the decorum of print 
culture. An improvisation by Williams pleads the decorum of unbookish or 
unlettered writing, as in the work of a talented but undisciplined amateur, 
author of unrelinquished inspirations, the unschooled or untrammeled poet 
whom no one (unless Shakespeare) has imitated so perfectly as our Good 
Physician. 
The mild irony is that Kora in Hell: Improvisations is a book, and one that 
swells with many bookish devices: its making required that private writings 
be mediated by certain editorial or explanatory alternatives to revision: a 
prologue, ancillary commentaries, intervening "interpretations" and short 
statements of principle?varieties of self-exegesis that gather the improvisa 
tions into a state of legitimacy. Hugh Kenner once made the happy observa 
tion that bad writing is writing that gets published by mistake. One func 
tion of the editorial machinery in Kora in Hell is to make sure no one sup 
poses a mistake has been made: we are meant to understand that whoever 
put this book together knew very well what he was doing (for example, 
risking himself against the assumption, widely held, that no one gets it right 
the first time). The improvisations are uncontrolled, but not out of control. 
They may fail (they may fail to please), but they are not failed versions of 
that in which others have succeeded: not inadvertent failures published by 
mistake: not bad writing. They are (let us speculate) experimental, like so 
many lyrical ballads, and so have a provision for failure built into their 
originating motive: he who experiments may fail, but in unprecedented 
ways apt to be more savored than scorned. Experiments resemble improvi 
sations insofar as one cannot know how they will turn out: they may suc 
cessfully disclose what we cannot hope to achieve. To disclose a saving mo 
tive the improvisator takes recourse to self-exegesis, which since ancient 
times has been a primary form of authorizing discourse, especially when the 
"unschooled" or vernacular writer desired to free his lines from the tram 
mels of Latin. We know how Williams aspired to vernacular eloquence, and 
how he redoubled his effort when confronted by the literariness of Eliot, 
Pound, and Stevens. Of more direct interest is his offhand or comic desire 
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for a museum of vernacular art: 
I wish Arensberg had my opportunity for prying into jaded house 
holds where the paintings of Mama's and Papa's flowertime still hang 
on the walls. I propose that Arensberg be commissioned by the Inde 
pendent Artists to scour the country for the abortive paintings of those 
men and women who without master or method have evolved 
perhaps two or three unusual creations in their early years. . . . Care 
fully selected, these queer products might be housed to good effect in 
some 
unpretentious exhibition chamber across the city from the Met 
ropolitan Museum of Art. (11-12) 
One wonders what it would be like actually to visit the kind of exhibition 
Williams has in mind. Fortunately, one need not specify in detail what such 
an exhibition would contain, because "abortive paintings"?no doubt 
everywhere to be found?would be worth gathering into one place only on 
behalf of a mainly satiric principle, or principle of divergence and ridicule: a 
museum of "unusual creations" and 
"queer products" ("The pure products 
of America"?) would make sense only if it were placed in opposition to ("ac 
ross the city from") the Metropolitan Museum of Art. By "across the city" 
Williams means precisely on the wrong side of the tracks, for the hangings 
of such an exhibition would be intelligible or valuable chiefly in terms of 
what is missing among them: high art, canonized art, art worth preserving 
for its own sake. One would therefore visit such a gallery as one would pro 
fess a new allegience, or renounce an old authority. Such testimony is re 
lated to the way vernacular utterances make their claim upon literary or 
trained attention: they are divergences from the better sort of speech, lapses 
from Latin or Literature into vulgarity?failed utterances, to be sure, but 
unmistakenly so, in the mad conviction that failure of a vulgar or divergent 
kind is a mode of violence and therefore of refreshment: that is, originality. 
Originality is, among other things, a failure to preserve what everyone had 
thought valuable. To speak in Latin is to speak the language of 
preservation?the language of writing and museums, of poetry and 
tradition?but to 
speak a vernacular is to strike out on one's own, "without 
master or method," improvising decorum, not knowing where one will 
end up because no one has gone this way before. 
What authorizes vulgarity? On the wrong side of the tracks anything 
goes: it is where poetry may be made out of anything. For example: "One 
day Duchamp decided that his composition for that day would be the first 
thing that struck his eye in the first hardware store he should enter. It turned 
out to be a pickax which he bought and set up in his studio. This was his 
composition" (12). (To improvise is to make do with whatever lies at 
hand.) A hardware store is not a museum, not by itself it isn't, but it con 
tains everything requisite to the making of one?a museum of modern art 
or, as Duchamp would want it, a museum of American art: a vernacular 
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museum which to the unschooled (academic) eye would be indistinguisha 
ble from a hardware store. How does one become schooled to see such a 
hardware store as a museum? One does so by consideration of such gestures 
as Duchamp's: the decision to compose a pickax (or whatever) by picking 
one up at the nearest hardware store was an authorizing decision, and an in 
dividual appropriation of the cultural procedures by which many brute and 
transient things get institutionalized as things worth preserving. Whence 
comes Duchamp's authority to render such a decision? For an answer we 
may turn to Kora in Hell, which requires us to consider how on earth we can 
regard these makeshift utterances as art, that is, as something worth pre 
serving. By what right did Williams collect his improvisations into a book 
when these improvisations are (to the unschooled eye, of which early re 
viewers had many) indistinguishable from bad writing? 
It could be said that what is modern is always unauthorized from the 
standpoint of what precedes it. It is at least true that modernism is always a 
vernacular phenomenon. Any reasonable definition of modernism?one 
which could be applied to Dante as well as to Williams?would provide for 
the corollary that in a modern state of affairs we have only the artist's word 
for what he is doing. Williams once remarked that the modern writer must 
be his own interpreter, because he alone is sufficiently schooled in his labors 
to be able to speak with authority concerning them. When two or more 
self-interpreters understand one another you have the beginnings of a 
school; if disciples appear you may have a movement; when critics replace 
the masters as voices of instruction you have a tradition, and the end of 
modernism, and a need to improvise. 
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